O artigo tem o objetivo de apresentar a produção do conhecimento, teses e dissertações que pesquisaram a temática das ações afirmativas no Brasil. Para isso, iniciou-se a pesquisa escolhendo uma base de dados, a BDTD, que permitiu acessar as teses e dissertações produzidas nos Programas de Pós-Graduação no Brasil. Em seguida optou-se por utilizar o termo “ações afirmativas” para realizar a pesquisa bibliográfica dentro da base de dados. As informações obtidas foram sistematizadas em planilha do tipo “excel”. Como resultado, foram (...) localizadas 373 produções do conhecimento sendo 173 na região Sudeste, 82 na região Sul, 68 na região Nordeste, 41 na região Centro-Oeste e 9 na região Norte. (shrink)

Kant clearly endorses some version of the ‘old formula of the schools’, according to which all volition is sub ratione boni. There has been a debate whether he holds this only for morally good actions. I argue that a closer look at the distinction between the good and the agreeable does not support this conclusion. Considering Kant’s account of the detrimental and the correct use of this thesis, I argue that rational beings always will sub ratione boni, even when they (...) act immorally, because they act on principles. I argue that Kant’s accounts of self-love and self-conceit support this view. (shrink)

Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and (...) non-attentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The Questions of Medical Ethics Call him Andrew. His face is gaunt and unshaven but peaceful. His eyelids are gently closed. ...

In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills result from a process of organism attunement to its environment.

Un bambino di quattro anni nascosto sotto il tavolo in cucina, nell'attesa degli eventi che diventeranno poi la sua vita. È questa la prima immagine che appare a Emanuele Severino quando, errando tra i ricordi, riavvolge i fili della propria esistenza. Errando, appunto, perché il ricordo è di per sé falso e distratto. Tra aneddoti e suggestioni, riaffiorano l'infanzia a Brescia e gli anni della guerra; la scomparsa del fratello Giuseppe, arruolatosi come "volontario" sul fronte francese, e l'incontro con Esterina, (...) "la ragazza più bella di Brescia", che diventerà sua moglie ed è lo sfondo di queste pagine; gli studi universitari a Pavia e l'insegnamento alla Cattolica di Milano, a seguito del "maestro" Gustavo Bontadini; la controversia con la Chiesa, che nel 1970 proclamò l'incompatibilità delle sue posizioni con quelle della dottrina cattolica; il rapporto con i figli; la stesura delle sue opere e le conversazioni filosofiche con gli amici. Emanuele Severino, con uno sguardo delicato e ironico, ripercorre la sua vita, illuminando luoghi, volti ed esperienze, perché "ciò che se ne va scompare per un poco. Ma poi, tutto ciò che è scomparso riappare". (shrink)

É inegável a influência que a obra de Nietzsche exerceu na filosofia de Deleuze. Inaugurando, de certo modo, um novo estilo de pensamento na cultura do Ocidente, Nietzsche conferiu novas interpretações a certos conceitos filosóficos considerados imutáveis e eternos, como os conceitos de verdade, de essência e de força. Utilizando-se da tipologia de forças nietzschianas, Deleuze nos mostra como o saber do Ocidente se funda em um pensamento que o filósofo francês denominará de representacional, em oposição a um pensamento da (...) diferença, elucidando como estas duas formas de conhecer se correlacionam a tipos distintos de forças. Assim, o conceito de força cunhado por Nietzsche permitirá a Deleuze não somente traçar uma crítica ao saber ocidental - predominantemente representacional -, como também desenvolver sua própria filosofia da diferença, profundamente influenciada pela crítica e pelo perspectivismo nietzschianos. The influence of Nietzsche’s work in Deleuze’s philosophy is undeniable. Starting a new style of thinking in the western culture, Nietzsche gave new interpretations to certain philosophical concepts considered immutable and eternal, like the concepts of truth, essence and force. Using Nietzsche’s typology of forces, Deleuze shows us how the western knowledge is constituted by a thought the French philosopher calls representational, as opposed to a thought of difference, elucidating how these two ways of knowledge relate to different types of forces. Therefore, the concept of force, created by Nietzsche, allows Deleuze to draw a criticism on western knowledge and also to develop his own philosophy of the difference, deeply influenced by the critic and perspectivism of Nietzsche’s philosophy. (shrink)

Within feminist literature from the early 1970s to this day, assisted reproductive technologies have been largely known to divide, replace or eliminate biological motherhood. For example, while in the past biological motherhood was considered a continuous experience, in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and IVF using egg donation allowed a split between two biological mothers, one providing eggs (genetic mother) and the other one gestation (gestational mother). This split was considered irreparable: the genetic mother could not be also gestational, and vice versa. (...) On the contrary, this paper aims to show that assisted reproductive technologies may also have a constructive potential towards biological motherhood(s). To explain how it could be possible, two existing techniques are explored: the first is maternal spindle transfer, which allows a double genetic motherhood; the second is reciprocal effortless IVF, which supposedly enables a double gestational motherhood. While in the first part, these techniques are examined singularly, in the second part a feasible combination of them is speculated. The idea is that assisted reproductive technologies could ‘recombine’ genetic and gestational motherhood in two figures that include both, namely in two ‘complete’ biological mothers, both genetic and gestational. (shrink)

It is widely held that all lies are assertions: the traditional definition of lying entails that, in order to lie, speakers have to assert something they believe to be false. It is also widely held that assertion contrasts with presupposition and, in particular, that one cannot assert something by presupposing it. Together, these views imply that speakers cannot lie with presuppositions—a view that Andreas Stokke has recently explicitly defended. The aim of this paper is to argue that speakers can lie (...) with presuppositions, and to discuss some of the implications this outcome has for current research on lying, assertion and presupposition. (shrink)

Comprehensive in scope and research, this book will be a crucial resource for researchers in the medical sciences, as well as teachers and students alike.

The distinction between lying and mere misleading is commonly tied to the distinction between saying and conversationally implicating. Many definitions of lying are based on the idea that liars say something they believe to be false, while misleaders put forward a believed-false conversational implicature. The aim of this paper is to motivate, spell out, and defend an alternative approach, on which lying and misleading differ in terms of commitment: liars, but not misleaders, commit themselves to something they believe to be (...) false. This approach entails that lying and misleading involve speech-acts of different force. While lying requires the committal speech-act of asserting, misleading involves the non-committal speech-act of suggesting. The approach leads to a broader definition of lying that can account for lies that are told while speaking non-literally or with the help of presuppositions, and it allows for a parallel definition of misleading, which so far is lacking in the debate. (shrink)

Because rate of force development is an emerging outcome measure for the assessment of neuromuscular function in unfatigued conditions, and it represents a valid alternative/complement to the classical evaluation of pure maximal strength, this scoping review aimed to map the available evidence regarding RFD as an indicator of neuromuscular fatigue. Thus, following a general overview of the main studies published on this topic, we arbitrarily compared the amount of neuromuscular fatigue between the “gold standard” measure and peak, early and late (...) RFD. Seventy full-text articles were included in the review. The most-common fatiguing exercises were resistance exercises, endurance exercises/locomotor activities, isokinetic contractions, and simulated/real sport situations. The most widely tested tasks were knee extension and plantar flexion. The reason for evaluating RFD was lacking in 36% of the studies. On average, the amount of fatigue for MVF was comparable to late RFD but lower compared to both peak RFD and early RFD. Even if the rationale for evaluating RFD in the fatigued state was often lacking and the specificity between test task and fatiguing exercise characteristics was not always respected in the included studies, RFD seems to be a valid indicator of neuromuscular fatigue. Based on our arbitrary analyses, peak RFD and early phase RFD appear even to be more sensitive to quantify neuromuscular fatigue than MVF and late phase RFD. (shrink)

To understand the endogenous components of the event-related brain potential (ERP), we must use data about the components' antecedent conditions to form hypotheses about the information-processing function of the underlying brain activity. These hypotheses, in turn, generate testable predictions about the consequences of the component. We review the application of this approach to the analysis of the P300 component. The amplitude of the P300 is controlled multiplicatively by the subjective probability and the task relevance of the eliciting events, whereas its (...) latency depends on the duration of stimulus evaluation. These and other factors suggest that the P300 is a manifestation of activity occurring whenever one's model of the environment must be revised. Tests of three predictions based on this “context updating” model are reviewed. Verleger's critique is based on a misconstrual of the model as well as a partial and misleading reading of the relevant literature. (shrink)

We analyze recent criticisms of the use of hyperreal probabilities as expressed by Pruss, Easwaran, Parker, and Williamson. We show that the alleged arbitrariness of hyperreal fields can be avoided by working in the Kanovei–Shelah model or in saturated models. We argue that some of the objections to hyperreal probabilities arise from hidden biases that favor Archimedean models. We discuss the advantage of the hyperreals over transferless fields with infinitesimals. In Paper II we analyze two underdetermination theorems by Pruss and (...) show that they hinge upon parasitic external hyperreal-valued measures, whereas internal hyperfinite measures are not underdetermined. (shrink)

Dieses Buch bietet die erste systematische Interpretation von Husserls Ideen für eine reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie anhand der neuen kritischen Edition von Ideen II. Es ermöglicht eine phänomenologische Auslegung des allgemein-metaphysischen Problems, wie physische, mentale und soziale Tatsachen zusammenhängen. Das Buch diskutiert und interpretiert detailliert einige von Husserls zentralen Konzeptionen und zeigt die Konsequenzen seines Denkansatzes und seiner Theorieentwicklung. Natur und Gemeingeist sind Husserl zufolge die Grundbegriffe der naturalistischen und der personalistischen Einstellungen und dienen als Leitfaden der Unterscheidung zwischen (...) Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften. In der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit diesem wissenschaftstheoretischen Dualismus führt Husserl den Habitus-Begriff methodisch ein, um das Verhältnis von Natur- und Sozialontologie aus der konkreten Erfahrung heraus phänomenologisch neu zu deuten, womit der spätere, anti-dualistische Weg der Lebensweltphänomenologie vorbereitet wird. In Husserls Studien zur Regionalontologie des Gemeingeistes rückt das konkrete Subjekt in den Vordergrund der Intentionalitätsanalyse, indem die sinntragenden Elemente der Inaktualitität auf Habitualisierungsprozesse und die Intersubjektivität auf Sozialisierungsstufen zurückgeführt werden. Dank der durch den Habitus-Begriff ermöglichten klaren Unterscheidung zwischen konstituierender Aktualität und konstitutiver Relevanz des inaktuellen Horizonts kann Husserls Philosophie des Geistes als individualistisch und holistisch zugleich gelten. Dieser ontologischen Position entspricht auch Husserls sozialepistemologische Ansicht, dass sich Wissenschaften erst im Rahmen idealisierter Sozialstrukturen entfalten können. Durch diese idealisierenden Operationen wird die Konstitution der Objektivität möglich, welche die Wissenschaften anstreben. Deren Rationalität ist deshalb in ihren konkreten und idealisierten Sozialitätsstufen und Habitualitäten zu befragen. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seem not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...) while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the second part, based on Alva Noë's actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call 'space of actions' to the logical space of reasons. (shrink)

Drawing on evolutionary epistemology, process ontology, and a social-cognition approach, this book suggests cognitive evolution, an evolutionary-constructivist social and normative theory of change and stability of international social orders. It argues that practices and their background knowledge survive preferentially, communities of practice serve as their vehicle, and social orders evolve. As an evolutionary theory of world ordering, which does not borrow from the natural sciences, it explains why certain configurations of practices organize and govern social orders epistemically and normatively, and (...) why and how these configurations evolve from one social order to another. Suggesting a multiple and overlapping international social orders' approach, the book uses three running cases of contested orders - Europe's contemporary social order, the cyberspace order, and the corporate order - to illustrate the theory. Based on the concepts of common humanity and epistemological security, the author also submits a normative theory of better practices and of bounded progress. (shrink)

In this paper we show how some reasoning, though fallacious, can appear to be attractive and useful for beings-like-us. Although they do not provide conclusive evidence to support or reject a certain claim the way scientific statements do, they tell us something interesting about how humans build up their arguments and reasons. First of all, we will consider and investigate three main types of fallacies: argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad verecundiam, and argumentum ad populum. These three fallacies are traditionally considered (...) as examples of a broader category called ignoratio elenchi. Secondly, we show how people who commit these fallacies rely on information about other human beings in their reasoning. That is, they do not follow certain logical procedures that eventually lead them to correct conclusions. But they simply make use of others as social characters. For example, being an authority, being an expert, being part of a class, etc., become the substitutes for more direct evidence to support a certain claim or to make an argument more appealing. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA probability model is underdetermined when there is no rational reason to assign a particular infinitesimal value as the probability of single events. Pruss claims that hyperreal probabilities are underdetermined. The claim is based upon external hyperreal-valued measures. We show that internal hyperfinite measures are not underdetermined. The importance of internality stems from the fact that Robinson’s transfer principle only applies to internal entities. We also evaluate the claim that transferless ordered fields may have advantages over hyperreals in probabilistic modeling. (...) We show that probabilities developed over such fields are less expressive than hyperreal probabilities. (shrink)

In Emanuel Adler's distinctive constructivist approach to international relations theory, international practices evolve in tandem with collective knowledge of the material and social worlds. This book - comprising a selection of his journal publications, a new introduction and three previously unpublished articles - points IR constructivism in a novel direction, characterized as 'communitarian'. Adler's synthesis does not herald the end of the nation-state; nor does it suggest that agency is unimportant in international life. Rather, it argues that what mediates (...) between individual and state agency and social structures are communities of practice, which are the wellspring and repositories of collective meanings and social practices. The concept of communities of practice casts new light on epistemic communities and security communities, helping to explain why certain ideas congeal into human practices and others do not, and which social mechanisms can facilitate the emergence of normatively better communities. (shrink)

Many recent definitions of lying are based on the notion of what is said. This paper argues that says-based definitions of lying cannot account for lies involving non-literal speech, such as metaphor, hyperbole, loose use or irony. It proposes that lies should instead be defined in terms of assertion, where what is asserted need not coincide with what is said. And it points to possible implications this outcome might have for the ethics of lying.

In this paper I will discuss some issues related to a recent trend in experimental philosophy (or x-phi), and try to show the reasons of its late (and scarce) involvement with aesthetics, compared to other areas of philosophical investigation. In order to do this, it is first necessary to ask how an autonomous experimental philosophy of aesthetics could be related to the long-standing tradition of psychological experimental aesthetics. After distinguishing between a “narrow” and a “broad” approach of experimental philosophy, I (...) will then make a distinction between topics in aesthetics pertaining to perceptual and cognitive processes, and traditional issues involved in the analysis of general and culturally-laden concepts. The narrow program of experimental philosophy, focused on the investigation of folk intuitions, is particularly effective only when two general conditions are met: the use of hypothetical scenarios (testing of thought experiments) and the heuristic role of folk intuitions in drawing philosophically relevant conclusions. I will argue that, when aesthetics is concerned, these requirements are not easily met. These difficulties notwithstanding, I will support a pluralistic view where aesthetics is revealed as an instructive example of how experimental approaches and traditional “armchair” philosophy integrate, and enrich each other. (shrink)

Dieses Buch bietet die erste systematische Interpretation von Husserls Ideen für eine reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie anhand der neuen kritischen Edition von Ideen II. Es ermöglicht eine phänomenologische Auslegung des allgemein-metaphysischen Problems, wie physische, mentale und soziale Tatsachen zusammenhängen. Das Buch diskutiert und interpretiert detailliert einige von Husserls zentralen Konzeptionen und zeigt die Konsequenzen seines Denkansatzes und seiner Theorieentwicklung. Natur und Gemeingeist sind Husserl zufolge die Grundbegriffe der naturalistischen und der personalistischen Einstellungen und dienen als Leitfaden der Unterscheidung zwischen (...) Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften. In der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit diesem wissenschaftstheoretischen Dualismus führt Husserl den Habitus-Begriff methodisch ein, um das Verhältnis von Natur- und Sozialontologie aus der konkreten Erfahrung heraus phänomenologisch neu zu deuten, womit der spätere, anti-dualistische Weg der Lebensweltphänomenologie vorbereitet wird. In Husserls Studien zur Regionalontologie des Gemeingeistes rückt das konkrete Subjekt in den Vordergrund der Intentionalitätsanalyse, indem die sinntragenden Elemente der Inaktualitität auf Habitualisierungsprozesse und die Intersubjektivität auf Sozialisierungsstufen zurückgeführt werden. Dank der durch den Habitus-Begriff ermöglichten klaren Unterscheidung zwischen konstituierender Aktualität und konstitutiver Relevanz des inaktuellen Horizonts kann Husserls Philosophie des Geistes als individualistisch und holistisch zugleich gelten. Dieser ontologischen Position entspricht auch Husserls sozialepistemologische Ansicht, dass sich Wissenschaften erst im Rahmen idealisierter Sozialstrukturen entfalten können. Durch diese idealisierenden Operationen wird die Konstitution der Objektivität möglich, welche die Wissenschaften anstreben. Deren Rationalität ist deshalb in ihren konkreten und idealisierten Sozialitätsstufen und Habitualitäten zu befragen. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.

The initial problem which motivated the writing of this thesis arose from reading of Emile by Rousseau. In this work, it was possible to detect the influence of different theoretical approaches, such as rationalism and empiricism, inspiring the development of the educational plan designed by Rousseau for his imaginary student (Emile). The very core question of the present thesis regards to whether there was a theory of knowledge pertaining to Rousseau’s philosophical thinking and, if so, how it was related to (...) his theories of education. In the set of his oeuvre, Rousseau’s affiliation to authors like Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Malebranche, as well as Condillac, Diderot, D’Holbach and Helvétius was discovered. As the reading of the great philosophical work of Rousseau progressed, an original knowledge theory was discovered, of the kind which accepts the coexistence of opposite thoughts. Pedagogy, in the context of (the work) Emile, arose out of the miscellany of such theories and also for the intense philosophical maturing process on the core of Rousseau’s thinking. This study intended, therefore, to understand the origin and development of Rousseau’s theory of knowledge, and also to figure out how the philosopher formulated his theories on Education, especially in Emile. The object of this research, materialized through the extensive bibliography of the Swiss philosopher, was intensively read and analyzed. The methodology used was that of comparative, descriptive and critical documentary research of the mentioned authors. This research is divided into three sections: the first one intends to investigate the philosophical influence from different authors on the foundations of Rousseau’s epistemology; the second section addresses Rousseau’s theories of Education; the third and final part investigates the link between theory of knowledge and Education within Rousseau’s philosophical thought. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper we show how some reasoning, though fallacious, can appear to be attractive and useful for beings-like-us. Although they do not provide conclusive evidence to support or reject a certain claim the way scientific statements do, they tell us something interesting about how humans build up their arguments and reasons. First of all, we will consider and investigate three main types of fallacies: argumentum ad hominem , argumentum ad verecundiam , and argumentum ad populum . These three fallacies (...) are traditionally considered as examples of a broader category called ignoratio elenchi. Secondly, we show how people who commit these fallacies rely on information about other human beings in their reasoning. That is, they do not follow certain logical procedures that eventually lead them to correct conclusions. But they simply make use of others as social characters. For example, being an authority, being an expert, being part of a class, etc., become the substitutes for more direct evidence to support a certain claim or to make an argument more appealing. (shrink)

The concept of adaptation is employed in many fields such as biology, psychology, cognitive sciences, robotics, social sciences, even literacy and art,1 and its meaning varies quite evidently according to the particular research context in which it is applied. We expect to find a particularly rich catalogue of meanings within evolutionary biology, where adaptation has held a particularly central role since Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859) throughout important epistemological shifts and scientific findings that enriched and diversified the concept. Accordingly, (...) a conceptual taxonomy of adaptation in evolutionary biology may help to disambiguate it. Interdisciplinary researches focused on adaptation would benefit from such a result. In the present work we recognize and define seven different meanings of adaptation: (1) individual fitness; (2) adaptation of a population; (3) adaptation as the process of natural selection; (4) adaptive traits; (5) molecular adaptation; (6) adaptation as structural tinkering; (7) plasticity. For convenience here, we refer to them as W-, P-, NS-, T-, M-, S- and PL-ADAPTATION. We present the seven meanings in some detail, hinting at their respective origins and conceptual developments in the history of evolutionary thought (references are offered for further deepening). However, it is important to point out that evolution researchers seldom if ever refer to a single meaning purified from the others. This applies also to the authors we cite as representatives of one of the seven meanings. In Discussion and Conclusion draw from our work some future perspectives for adaptation within evolutionary biology. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of τ-like partial order, where τ is one of the linear order types ω, ω*, ω + ω*, and ζ. For example, being ω-like means that every element has finitely many predecessors, while being ζ-like means that every interval is finite. We consider statements of the form “any τ-like partial order has a τ-like linear extension” and “any τ-like partial order is embeddable into τ” . Working in the framework of reverse mathematics, we show that these (...) statements are equivalent either to equation image or to equation image over the usual base system equation image. (shrink)

In the past few years, machine learning (ML) tools have been implemented with success in the medical context. However, several practitioners have raised concerns about the lack of transparency—at the algorithmic level—of many of these tools; and solutions from the field of explainable AI (XAI) have been seen as a way to open the ‘black box’ and make the tools more trustworthy. Recently, Alex London has argued that in the medical context we do not need machine learning tools to be (...) interpretable at the algorithmic level to make them trustworthy, as long as they meet some strict empirical desiderata. In this paper, we analyse and develop London’s position. In particular, we make two claims. First, we claim that London’s solution to the problem of trust can potentially address another problem, which is how to evaluate the reliability of ML tools in medicine for regulatory purposes. Second, we claim that to deal with this problem, we need to develop London’s views by shifting the focus from the opacity of algorithmic details to the opacity of the way in which ML tools are trained and built. We claim that to regulate AI tools and evaluate their reliability, agencies need an explanation of how ML tools have been built, which requires documenting and justifying the technical choices that practitioners have made in designing such tools. This is because different algorithmic designs may lead to different outcomes, and to the realization of different purposes. However, given that technical choices underlying algorithmic design are shaped by value-laden considerations, opening the black box of the design process means also making transparent and motivating (technical and ethical) values and preferences behind such choices. Using tools from philosophy of technology and philosophy of science, we elaborate a framework showing how an explanation of the training processes of ML tools in medicine should look like. (shrink)

In arguing against a supposed ambiguity, philosophers often rely on the zeugma test. In an application of the zeugma test, a supposedly ambiguous expression is placed in a sentence in which several of its supposed meanings are forced together. If the resulting sentence sounds zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence for ambiguity; if it does not sound zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence against ambiguity. The aim of this article is to show that arguments based on the second direction of (...) the test are misguided: ambiguous expressions, and in particular philosophically contested ones, do not reliably lead to zeugmaticity, so an absence of zeugmaticity provides no meaningful evidence for an absence of ambiguity. (shrink)

Pictures are notably absent from the current debate about how to define lying. Theorists in this debate tend to focus on linguistic means of communication and do not consider the possibility of lying with photographs, drawings and other kinds of pictures. The aim of this paper is to show that such a narrow focus is misguided: there is a strong case to be made for the possibility of lying with pictures and this possibility allows for insights concerning the question of (...) how lying should be defined. (shrink)

In the past few years, the ethical ramifications of AI technologies have been at the center of intense debates. Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how a morally responsible practice of data science can be promoted and which values have to shape it. In this context, ethics and moral responsibility have been mainly conceptualized as compliance to widely shared principles. However, several scholars have highlighted the limitations of such a principled approach. Drawing from microethics and the virtue theory tradition, (...) in this paper, we formulate a different approach to ethics in data science which is based on a different conception of “being ethical” and, ultimately, of what it means to promote a morally responsible data science. First, we develop the idea that, rather than only compliance, ethical decision-making consists in using certain moral abilities, which are cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the data science process. An aspect of virtue development that we discuss here is moral attention, which is the ability of data scientists to identify the ethical relevance of their own technical decisions in data science activities. Next, by elaborating on the capability approach, we define a technical act as ethically relevant when it impacts one or more of the basic human capabilities of data subjects. Therefore, rather than “applying ethics”, data scientists should cultivate ethics as a form of reflection on how technical choices and ethical impacts shape one another. Finally, we show how this microethical framework concretely works, by dissecting the ethical dimension of the technical procedures involved in data understanding and preparation of electronic health records. (shrink)

ECONOMIA CRIATIVA: CONCEITO E RELAÇÃO COM O DIREITO.

Stephen Hetherington é um dos mais proeminentes epistemólogos a defender que é possível ter conhecimento segundo as condições de crença verdadeira e justificada, apesar dos contraexemplos elaborados por Edmund Gettier. Ele fundamentou sua perspectiva no pressuposto de falibilidade do conhecimento e naquilo que ele chamou de "falácia de contrafactuais epistêmicos", segundo a qual não se deve assumir impossibilidade do conhecimento factual apenas em virtude da sua impossibilidade contrafactual - o que é reiterado por Anthony Booth. As críticas apresentadas por Brent (...) Madison, John Turri e Duncan Prtichard apontaram para a relevância das suas ideias, mas também para o fato de que Hetherington ignorou que há diferentes tipos de sorte que podem interferir no processo de aquisição de conhecimento. Palavras-chave: Falácia de contrafactuais epistêmicos. Falibilismo. Infalibilismo. Sorte epistêmica. Stephen Hetherington. (shrink)

Intentionalism is the view that demonstratives, gradable adjectives, quantifiers, modals and other context‐sensitive expressions are intention‐sensitive: their semantic value on a given use is fixed by speaker intentions. The first aim of this paper is to defend Intentionalism against three recent objections, according to which speakers at least sometimes do not have suitable intentions when using supposedly intention‐sensitive expressions. Its second aim is to thereby shed light on the so far little‐explored question of which kinds of intentions can be semantically (...) relevant. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 60-62, June 2011.